Monetary policy in Asia: approaches and implementation by Robert Neil McCauley & Bank for International Settlements
172  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
Understanding monetary policy in 
Malaysia and Thailand: objectives, 
instruments and independence 
Robert Neil McCauley
1 
1. Introduction   
This paper sets out to update the author’s overview of monetary policy in East Asia, 
presented at the Reserve Bank of Australia in 2001 and subsequently issued as a SEACEN 
Centre Occasional Paper. At the request of the Hong Kong Institute of Monetary Research, 
however, this paper focuses more narrowly on monetary policy in Malaysia and Thailand.  
This tale of two policies features a broadly similar pursuit of price stability, in one case 
outside of, and in the other case within, an explicit inflation targeting framework. It features 
orientations to exchange rate stability: one until July 2005 explicitly bilateral and since 
evidently so; and the other looser and evidently effective. It features similar but not identical 
assignments of instruments to the achievement of these objectives. And both central banks 
set policy enjoying considerable behavioural independence, which might be usefully 
strengthened by greater legal independence.  
This paper’s survey of more recent events and its narrower focus allow an examination of 
how the two central banks have responded to the challenge of higher energy prices in 2004-
05. We find that the fiscalisation of energy costs has reduced the challenge in Malaysia, 
while mostly just delaying it in Thailand. Given the need in an inflation targeting framework to 
specify the operating definition of inflation, there was a risk in Thailand of an inappropriate 
response to energy prices that not only showed great volatility but also a significant trend. In 
the event, the inflation targeting framework in general, and its focus on a core measure of 
inflation in particular, have not gotten in the way of an appropriate response to this upward 
trend in energy prices.   
The plan of the paper follows that of the earlier one. First, the goals of monetary policy are 
discussed, and then the instruments. Finally, the question of whether the central bank enjoys 
sufficient independence to do the job is raised. 
2. Goals 
The central banks of Malaysia and Thailand have two main monetary policy goals: low 
inflation and stable exchange rates. In the case of Malaysia, the contribution of these goals 
to growth and development is often stressed. In addition, each at times pursues financial 
stability not through setting short-term interest rates but rather through credit or prudential 
policies. Finally, each takes seriously a developmental role vis-à-vis financial markets and 
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the financial services industry, in part in order to improve the working and transmission of 
monetary policy.  
At first blush, multiple goals would seem to leave monetary policy overburdened and at risk 
of incoherence. The Tinbergian objection would be that the single stone (the short-term 
interest rate) cannot possibly hit so many birds. The next section on instruments, however, 
argues that there is a coherent assignment of instruments to the enumerated goals. To 
anticipate, the “impossible trinity” objection to having both inflation and exchange rate goals 
is answered through the assignment of the fractional instruments of (at times large) sterilised 
intervention and restrictions on cross-border movements of funds to the goal of exchange 
rate stability. 
2.1 Low  inflation 
The central banks of Malaysia and Thailand share a commitment to achieving low inflation. 
This is evident in their long-term records. Graph 1 shows the inflation rates in the two 
countries since the founding of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) in 1959 
and since 1966 for Thailand. In both countries double digit inflation rates have been rare. 
During the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the decline of the Malaysian ringgit from about 2.5 to the 
dollar to about 4 to the dollar, and the parallel decline of the Thai baht from 25 to over 40 to 
the dollar caused a temporary rise in inflation to levels well above the long-term averages. 
Even then, this recent episode of relatively high inflation was mild compared to that during 
the oil shocks of the early 1970s and around 1980, especially in Thailand. Graph 1 also 
shows that the upward trend in Thai consumer price inflation over the past several years has 







1  Average annual changes in consumer prices, in per cent.   
2  CPI excluding raw food and energy items. 
Source: National data. 
Table 1 shows the average, the range and the standard deviation of rates of inflation for the 
two Southeast Asian countries, as well as for Japan and the United States. Over the long 
run, inflation has averaged about 1% lower in Malaysia and about 1% higher in Thailand than 
in Japan or the United States. In the years since the Asian crisis, inflation has tended to be 




Inflation and its volatility in selected economies
1 
Since 1959
2  Since 2000 
 
Average  Max Min  SD  Average Max Min  SD 
Japan 3.9  25.1  –1.6 4.5 –0.5  0.8 –1.6  0.4 
Malaysia 3.1  23.9  –3.4  3.5  1.7  3.7  0.7  0.7 
Thailand 5.3  28.8  –2.0  5.2  2.0  6.2  0.1  1.3 
Thailand 
core
3 3.2 8.4  –0.1  2.4  0.7  2.4  –0.1  0.6 
United 
States 4.2 14.8 0.3 3.0 2.6 4.7 1.1 0.8 
1  Based on changes in consumer prices over 12 months.   
2  For Japan, since 1961; for Thailand, since 1966; 
for Thailand core inflation, since 1990.   
3  CPI excluding raw food and energy items. 
Source: National data. 
 
2.2  Exchange rate stability 
Policy in both Malaysia and Thailand has taken as one of its goals some form of exchange 
rate stability. This goal can at times come into conflict with the goal of low and stable inflation 
(see Amato et al (2005)). Such a conflict has occurred often enough among emerging market 
economies that many observers infer from evidence of exchange rate stabilisation that 
policymakers pay only lip service to the goal of low inflation. This inference is not warranted 
in the two cases at hand. 
Exchange rate stability can conflict with the goal of low and stable inflation if it leads to 
inappropriate setting of policy interest rates or if the exchange rate directly transmits foreign 
prices in an inflationary or deflationary fashion. In the cases at hand, owing to the incomplete 
openness of their capital accounts and to the chosen forms of exchange rate stability, 
exchange rate policy has not hijacked interest rate setting. Given this and an environment of 
stable to falling global traded goods prices, preventing large exchange rate movements can 
be seen as having helped maintain low and stable inflation in these highly open economies. 
That said, Malaysia’s former commitment to bilateral exchange rate stability ran a greater risk 
of posing a challenge to the maintenance of low inflation than Thailand’s apparent pursuit of 
effective exchange rate stability. If the dollar exchange rate is stabilised, a strong dollar may 
risk deflation (as in China in 2000-01), and a weak dollar, inflation. In contrast, with stability in 
an effective exchange rate, cycles in the major exchange rates tend to exert less of such 
cumulative deflationary or inflationary forces. 
Though it has taken different forms, the evident orientation of the two countries to exchange 
rate stability derives from similar structural characteristics. In both cases, the openness of the 
economy means that large effective exchange rate changes have the capacity to lead to an 
undesirable inflation or deflation. International experience of inflation targeting by emerging 
market economies in fact shows a significant association between large effective exchange 
rate changes, on the one hand, and missed inflation targets, on the other (Ho and McCauley 
(2003)). In addition, given the openness of both economies, large exchange rate 
appreciations can lead to an undesired loss of competitiveness in external markets, risking 
lower exports and economic activity. Finally, in addition to the effect on established firms, 
there is a widespread concern that exchange rate appreciation can undermine economies’ 
attractiveness to new foreign direct investment.  BIS Papers No 31  175
 
 
However similar the sources of the concern for the exchange rate, policy has differed. From 
September 1998 to July 2005, Malaysia opted for bilateral exchange rate stability against the 
US dollar, while Thailand can be interpreted as having more and more evidently opted for 
effective exchange rate stability. Graph 2 shows the bilateral dollar exchange rates and the 
effective exchange rates of the ringgit and baht through 2005. While the baht has ranged 
since early 2001 between 38 and 46 baht per dollar - about 20% - its effective exchange rate 
has ranged more narrowly between 92 and 101. This reflects the fact that the baht shares 
much of the movement against the dollar of the currencies of Thailand’s regional trading 
partners. In contrast, given that the ringgit until mid-2005 shared none of the movements 
against the dollar of the currencies of Malaysia’s trading partners, its effective exchange rate 
has ranged more widely than that of the baht. In particular, it traces out the dollar’s cycle 
against the major currencies, strengthening into early 2002 and weakening in the following 





1  2000 = 100; basket of 51 countries. 
Sources: National data; BIS. 
The contrast of Thailand’s exchange rate outcomes with Malaysia’s dollar peg is clear 
enough, but the interpretation of a stable effective rate as a policy goal requires further 
evidence. The null hypothesis is that observed effective stability in this decade (Table 2) is a 
market outcome. For instance, sterling, which is well known to have been free of official 176  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
intervention, has traded such that its effective exchange rate has not varied much in recent 
years.
2 One piece of evidence against the null is that market participants cite official 
intervention intended to influence the exchange rate on both sides of the market in the case 
of the baht. Another piece of evidence is public statements by Bank of Thailand officials, 
which often associate dollar/baht movements with parallel movements in regional currencies. 
This can be seen as not only an educational effort to refocus market participants away from 
the bilateral to the effective exchange rate but also a guide to the operational definition of 
stability.  
Table 2 
Historical volatility of the ringgit, baht, Singapore dollar and sterling 
Jan 1999 - May 2001  Jun 2001 - Dec 2005 
 
MYR THB SGD GBP  MYR  THB  SGD  GBP 
Bilateral vs US 
dollar  0.00 6.66 4.00 7.77  0.00 
(2.11)  4.56 4.65 8.13 
Effective  3.69 6.90 3.65 5.63  4.04 
(4.34)  3.49 2.95 5.53 
Note: Volatility measured as annualised standard deviation of weekly (end-Thursday) percentage changes. For 
the latter period, data for Malaysia are through to 20 July 2005; data for remainder of 2005 shown in 
parentheses. See Klau and Fung (2006) on BIS effective exchange rates. 
 
That effective exchange rate stability is a goal of policy in Thailand is made more plausible 
by the way that the baht traded before and after the change of central bank governors at 
end-May 2001. Before, a general policy of not intervening, and rather using variations in 
restrictions on cross-border capital flows to influence the exchange rate, left the baht among 
the more volatile currencies in East Asia other than the yen. Its bilateral dollar volatility was 
not far below that of sterling. From June 2001 to end-2005, the baht’s volatility, especially in 
effective terms, fell to levels below those observed for sterling and not far above those of the 
Singapore dollar, which is explicitly managed against an effective basket. Whether the goal is 
to stabilise the level of the effective exchange rate around some target path set to be 
consistent with the inflation target, as in Singapore, or only the volatility of the effective 
exchange rate is hard to say. 
Malaysia abandoned its commitment to bilateral exchange rate stability in favour of a 
commitment to effective exchange rate stability on 21 July 2005. Thus, in principle, the 
Malaysian and Thai interpretations of exchange rate stability have converged. Despite the 
announced shift in Malaysia, however, the bilateral volatility remains lower than the effective 
volatility. Graph 3 puts the management of the ringgit and baht in 2005 into a regional 
perspective, showing the ratio of a given currency’s bilateral exchange rate volatility against 
the dollar to its overall effective volatility against the weighted average of its trading partners’ 
currencies. The Chinese and Malaysian currencies registered a ratio of zero on this measure 
before 21 July because of their stability against the dollar and consequently considerable 
movement against the currencies of their trading partners. On this showing, Malaysia has 
moved quite a distance to over half since July 2005. As a result, the ringgit is closing in on 
the more dollar-oriented ASEAN currencies, namely the Indonesian rupiah and Philippine 
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peso. The ringgit still has a way to go, however, to show greater bilateral than effective 
volatility, as do the Korean won, Singapore dollar or the Thai baht. 
In passing, it is worth noting that the ringgit has made more of a move toward an effective 
orientation since July than the Chinese renminbi. Since the volatility ratio is constructed with 
weekly data, this is not solely a reflection of narrow de facto limits on movement of the 
renminbi against the dollar. Still, it can be said that Malaysia, and to a lesser extent China, 
have taken a first step toward the effective exchange rate orientation that is now typical of 
the region (Ho et al (2005)). The yen’s performance on this measure in a year without official 
intervention serves as a warning that greater stability against the trade-weighted basket than 
against the dollar can be a market rather than a policy outcome. 
Graph 3 
Ratio of bilateral dollar volatility to  




1  For China and Malaysia, since 24 July 2005; calculations based on weekly data (Thursday closings). 
Sources: National data; BIS. 
2.3 Other  goals 
Both central banks pursue other goals as well.
3 One common goal is financial stability. Asset 
prices in general and real estate prices in particular can give rise to concerns regarding 
overbuilding and unsustainable consumption on the upside and non-performing loans and 
“headwinds” slowing expenditure on the downside (Borio and White (2004), Disyatat (2005), 
Borio (2006), White (2006,a,b)). Consumer indebtedness that rises to excessive levels can 
also become a matter for policymakers’ concern. Neither central bank has a target for asset 
prices or debt burdens, nor necessarily a clear idea of what is too high. Instead, there is an 
occasional desire to lean against the wind of sentiment when this can place financial stability 
at risk. Such a desire does not contradict the assignment of interest rate policy to the 
achievement of low and stable inflation because other instruments are employed. If macro-
prudential policies succeed in, for instance, preventing a boom-bust cycle of debt-fueled 
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consumption, then it can leave less work to be done with policy rates. One thinks in this 
context of the mini-cycle of lower policy rates adopted by the Bank of Korea in 2004-05, 
partly in response to muted consumption after a previous spree of credit card use.   
Maintaining positive or at least non-negative real returns on bank deposits also seems a 
concern of policy, even if it does not amount to a fully fledged goal of policy. Bank Negara 
Malaysia expressed this concern clearly when it elaborated a new interest rate framework in 
April 2004. While the former linkage of the base lending rate to the policy rate was dropped, 
constraints on deposit rates were left in place. In particular, minimum deposit rates for small 
and medium-sized accounts were kept at a level near the policy rate.
4 Such pricing 
constraints generally allow for the assignment of (wholesale) short-term policy interest rates 
to the achievement of low and stable inflation. 
The developmental goals of the two central banks must also be recognised. Better 
functioning money and bond markets are clearly matters of active interest. These can be 
seen as a means of facilitating the transmission of monetary policy as well as ends in 
themselves. 
3. Instruments 
The burden of this section’s argument is that the Malaysian and Thai central banks match 
their several goals with several instruments. Like major central banks, each periodically 
announces a target level for a short-term policy interest rate. In addition, these central banks 
occasionally intervene in the foreign exchange market and thus place changes in their own 
balance sheets between flows on the current and capital account, on the one side, and the 
exchange rate, on the other. Their interventions in the foreign exchange market may have 
particular effect owing to the relatively small scale of the underlying asset stocks, and the 
remaining restrictions on capital account transactions overseen by both central banks. The 
other goals just discussed are pursued with still other instruments. 
3.1  Setting policy interest rates 
In setting policy interest rates, the two central banks show more similarities than differences. 
This section discusses the banks’ different choices of the policy rate and rhythm of 
announcing changes. Notwithstanding these differences, the two central banks carry out 
broadly similar monetary operations, and show similar success at hitting their short-term 
interest rate targets. 
3.1.1  Policy rates: choice, rhythm of decision-making and activism  
Both central banks periodically announce a target for a short-term rate on the basis of an 
assessment of the inflationary risks (Graph 4). An analogue to the US federal funds rate, the 
overnight interest rate, has served as the policy rate in Malaysia since April 2004: the 
“overnight policy rate” serving “as the indicator of monetary policy stance … is effectively the 
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target for the average overnight interbank rate”. The Bank of Thailand has since early 2000 

























1 Inflation based on changes in consumer prices over 12 months, in per cent; the shaded areas represent the inflation target ranges (not 
official for Malaysia).    2 CPI excluding raw food and energy items.  
Source: National data.
Policy rates and inflation1
 
 
The rhythm of monetary announcements differs. In the case of Bank Negara Malaysia, the 
stance of policy has been announced quarterly since early 2004. In the case of the Bank of 
Thailand, monetary announcements are made at twice that frequency, every six weeks. 
Beyond these differences in the term of the policy rate and the rhythm of policymaking, the 
difference in activism of the two central banks is striking. Bank Negara Malaysia kept the 
policy rate at 2.7% in all its announcements between February 2004 and August 2005, and 
for almost the previous four years that rate (though not designated as a policy rate) varied 
but little from that level. By this measure at least, Bank Negara Malaysia kept its interest rate 
settings stable for five years, far longer than did the European Central Bank. In contrast, the 
Bank of Thailand, having brought its policy rate down to 1.25% by mid-2003, set out about a 
year later on a tightening cycle that brought the policy rate to 5% in 2006. Another way of 
drawing the contrast is that the Bank of Thailand has moved rates down and up by a 
cumulative 5% since mid-2001, while Bank Negara Malaysia has moved its overnight rate by 
80 basis points. Whether fiscal policy has carried more of the burden of economic 
stabilisation in Malaysia than in Thailand, and, if so, why this is so are questions beyond the 
scope of this analysis. 
3.1.2  The character of monetary operations 
The operations carried out by the two central banks resemble each other, though the choice 
of instruments differs (Borio and McCauley (2001)). These two central banks operate on the 
same side of the market by draining reserves out of the banking system in the face of a 
chronic excess of liquidity. This similarity reflects the common balance sheet structure; in 
particular, their foreign exchange reserve holdings stand at a multiple of the note issue (or 
the monetary base) and they use relatively short-lived sterilisation instruments. Thus, the 
operations needed to hold short-term interest rates at targeted levels generally drain liquidity. 
Bank Negara Malaysia mostly takes outright interest bearing deposits from commercial 
banks through daily tenders at maturities ranging from weeks out to several months, while 
the Bank of Thailand drains liquidity through repos. In both cases, however, other 
instruments are used. In particular, both central banks issue their own bills to drain liquidity 
on a longer-term basis of up to one year maturity, in the case of Bank Negara, and up to two 
year maturity in the case of the Bank of Thailand. In the former case, the outstanding amount 
1  Inflation based on changes in consumer prices over 12 months, in per cent; the shaded areas represent the 
inflation target ranges (not official for Malaysia).   
2  CPI excluding raw food and energy items. 
Source: National data.
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of bills has been limited by the central bank law to a modest sum. Bank Negara Malaysia 
announced its intention to shift to repos against government securities (see below), and the 
Bank of Thailand also uses short-term foreign exchange swaps to control liquidity. In both 
cases, operations have something of the character of debt management, with maturing 
liabilities requiring to be rolled over. 
3.1.3  Do operations keep market interest rates at targeted levels? 
In both cases, money market rates have tended to track their policy targets closely 
(Graph 5). In neither case is there evidence that the very large liquidity injections movements 
associated with foreign exchange market intervention, whether on the buying or selling side, 
have led to significant deviations between realised money market rates and policy targets. 
(Of course, as a technical matter, the T+2 settlement norm in foreign exchange means that 
the flows associated with intervention are well telegraphed to the monetary policy 
operations.) In this sense, one can say that a thorough sterilisation of the intervention has 
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That said, the transmission of the policy interest rate out the yield curve can be strongly 
affected by exchange rate expectations. In the case of Malaysia, extensive foreign ownership 
of money market securities has at times allowed Malaysia’s money market yield curve to 
assume a peculiar shape. Twelve-month yields had fallen below the overnight policy rate 
even before 21 July 2005. In the immediate aftermath of that day’s announcement of the 
unpegging of the ringgit, Malaysian government bill yields fell still further to levels well below 
the overnight rate target. This reflected expectations of further appreciation of the ringgit by 
the foreign funds that owned the paper (Graph 6). Such a peculiarly shaped yield curve 
appears exceptional.
5 Indeed, as foreign investors have drawn the conclusion that there is 
not to be a quick killing to be made on long positions in the ringgit, they have sold their 
holdings of short-term central bank and government paper back to the Malaysian banking 
system, resulting in a more normal money market yield curve. 
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Policy rates 




Interest rates for Malaysia in 2005 
 
 
Sources: Bloomberg; national data. 
 
Box 
Estimating a Taylor rule for Thailand 
by Marc Klau and Robert N McCauley 
This box builds on Mohanty and Klau (2004) to estimate Taylor rule-type reaction functions for the 
Bank of Thailand. Our main finding is that Bank of Thailand policy in the period of inflation targeting 
can be most plausibly modelled using the Bank’s next year forecast of inflation. 
We first re-estimate the baseline model from Mohanty and Klau and find evidence inconsistent with 
the proposition that there is a consistent reaction function in the 1990s and in the last five years. 
When the sample is extended from 2002 to the second quarter of 2005, the response of the short-
term interest rate to inflation falls and becomes insignificant. Taken at face value, adding years 
during which the Bank of Thailand explicitly targets inflation produces estimates that convey an 
impression of increased gradualism (a higher value on the lagged short-term interest rate) and 
unresponsiveness to contemporaneous inflation! Also, a decline in the size and significance of the 
response to the contemporaneous real effective exchange rate is noticeable. We interpret these 
results to suggest that the reaction function differs across monetary policy regimes, since adding 
years from the more recent regime alters the findings.  
Thus, our next step is to focus on the period of inflation targeting since 2000, and to use the policy 
rate, the two-week repo rate, rather than the one-month interbank rate. We also re-run the HP filter 
to estimate the output gap over the more recent sample period. The results suggest a major change 
in the lack of any response to the exchange rate, whether measured as a real effective exchange 
rate, a nominal effective exchange rate or a bilateral dollar exchange rate. This change is robust to 
the further changes in the choice of headline or core inflation, or the use of forecasts instead of 
contemporaneous values.  
The estimated responses to inflation and the output gap over the period of inflation targeting 
become problematic, however. In particular, the response to contemporaneous inflation becomes so 
small that the long-run coefficient falls below one, suggesting that real interest rates are allowed to 
fall in the presence of higher inflation. In addition, the response to the output gap becomes 
perverse, and significantly so. These features are not changed when a dummy is entered for the 
100 basis point rise in the policy rate in May 2001. Use of the core rather than headline inflation 
increases the responsiveness of the policy rate, but the smaller coefficient on the lagged policy rate 
means that this greater short-term responsiveness does not translate to a much higher long-term 
response. Use of the core measure, moreover, leaves the response to the output gap perverse.  




Estimating a Taylor rule for Thailand 
Thus far, the estimated reaction functions have been backward-looking, with policy assumed to 
respond to realised inflation. The Bank of Thailand’s Inflation Reports make it possible to use the 
policymakers’ estimates of inflation at the end of the current year and at the end of the following 
year. Since these are given as fan charts, we use the centre of the distribution in the estimation. 
These forecasts for the following year do not have the straight line look of some inflation reports 
(Graphs 12 and 13). Use of the inflation outlook for the current year does not change the estimates 
materially, leaving the perverse response to the output gap. Use of the inflation outlook for the 
following year, however, eliminates the perversity in the case of headline CPI and produces a 
proper response to the output gap in the case of core CPI. This comes at the expense of a fairly 
weak response to inflation in the former case, and none in the latter case, and a coefficient on the 
lagged policy variable in the region of one.   
Finally, we investigated the sensitivity of the results to the period over which the HP filter was run in 
order to estimate the output gap. We found that, with potential output estimated over 1997-2005 
rather than 2000-2005, the perverse response to the output gap still shows up when 
contemporaneous inflation is used. However, the outlook for this year’s core inflation produces no 
perverse response to the output gap. Use of the more forward-looking next year’s headline or core 
inflation rates, moreover, produce the expected response to the output gap at standard levels of 
significance. Again, this comes at the cost of a fairly weak response to inflation and a possibly unit 
coefficient on the lagged policy rate. 
Taking it all together, several findings seem to emerge. First, no specification found a response of 
the policy rate to the exchange rate. This does not necessarily imply that the authorities are 
unconcerned with the exchange rate; it could imply that another instrument is assigned to it. 
Second, the estimates suggest that the policy rate is responding to forward-looking measures of 
inflation. 
Box table 
Estimated Taylor reaction function for Thailand 
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(3.24) 
 0.64 
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Box table (cont) 
Estimated Taylor reaction function for Thailand 
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 0.53 






















































































Note: t-statistics in parentheses. 
Abbreviations: Δcpi = annual percentage change in consumer prices; gap = output gap; Δxr = change in the real effective 
exchange rate (REER), nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) or in the bilateral exchange rate (XR) (up means 
appreciation); ir = interest rate (dependant variable). 
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3.2  Foreign exchange market intervention 
The main instrument assigned to the stabilisation of the ringgit and baht exchange rates is 
sterilised intervention (compare Disyatat and Galati (2005)). Its effectiveness is probably 
enhanced by the existence of capital controls in both countries. Moreover, these can be and 
have been varied in response to exchange rate pressures. 
Sterilised intervention has been described as a fractional instrument (Dooley et al (2002)). 
That is, it does not have the power of interest rate policy. Still, in combination with capital 
controls, themselves leaky and partial, sterilised intervention may afford considerable 
leverage over the exchange rate. 
As noted, Malaysia has used sterilised intervention to set the level of the exchange rate into 
July 2005, and perhaps to influence its level and volatility since then. Consistent with the 
difference in their exchange regimes, the Malaysian authorities have evidently used this 
instrument with greater vigour (Graph 7). Foreign exchange reserves rose in Malaysia to 
about 60% of GDP in the third quarter of 2005 before falling back toward 50% since. Foreign 
exchange reserves have fluctuated around 30% of GDP in Thailand. Short-term capital 
inflows were particularly strong in the fourth quarter of 2004 and third quarter of 2005. 
Graph 7 




1  In per cent. 
Sources: IMF; national data. 
Intervention as a fractional instrument gains force from capital controls. Their effectiveness is 
evident in both cases, though more so in the case of Malaysia. The offshore market for 
ringgit was successfully shut down in September 1998, and only in 2005 did a non-
deliverable market offshore develop any liquidity. Thus, it is not possible to test for the 
effectiveness of capital controls by measuring the difference between onshore and offshore 
yields, whether derived from deliverable or non-deliverable forwards (Ma et al (2004)). Given 
the fixed exchange rate, however, it is possible to test for the effectiveness of the capital 
controls by measuring the difference between ringgit and dollar yields at various maturities. 
Examining these interest rate differentials, Malaysia’s capital controls appear effective in the 
sense of permitting short-term ringgit interest rates to be set at very different levels than 
short-term US dollar interest rates (Graph 8). Moreover, the difference extends out the 
maturity spectrum, albeit to a lesser extent. Anyone who claims that Malaysia’s fixed 
exchange rate meant that it was importing its monetary policy from the Federal Reserve 
needs to explain the 600 basis point range in the gap between US dollar and ringgit money 
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1  Malaysian ringgit rates minus US dollar rates; monthly averages. 
Source: National data. 
In the case of the Thai baht, the sizeable although variable differences between on- and 
offshore baht interest rates signal effective capital controls. This holds whether offshore 
swap-implied rates are compared to their onshore counterparts (Graph 9a) or onshore 
interbank rates (Graph 9b). From 1999 into the first half of 2003, the evidence is consistent 
with an effective control on outward arbitrage, since offshore swaps often traded at levels 
implying higher offshore interest rates, but hardly ever with lower offshore rates. With strong 
capital inflows and chronic pressure for appreciation during much of 2002 and 2003, there 
was incipient pressure for offshore rates to fall below those onshore, but arbitrage kept the 
rates in line. In other words, into the third quarter of 2003, the Bank of Thailand oversaw an 
asymmetric regime, with effective constraints on lending baht to nonresidents but no 
measure preventing the flow of baht held by nonresidents into Thailand. In September and 
October 2003, however, the Bank of Thailand made its capital controls symmetric by limiting 
onshore financial institutions from borrowing more than 50 million baht from non-residents 
(Bank of Thailand (2003a,b)).
6 Since then, overnight differentials have shown more 
symmetry. In particular, non-resident demand for offshore exposure to the baht has often 
pushed the offshore overnight rate below its onshore counterpart. That the quite liquid 
offshore swap market at the one month tenor has not shown the same symmetry in its 
relationship to the onshore market suggests that the controls on inflows may not be as 
effective as their counterpart controls on outflows. 
                                                  
6   The October 2003 Inflation Report, pp 30-31, noted: “In July and August, overnight interbank was relatively 
low compared with 1-day repurchase rate as a result of shift of borrowing by financial institutions from the 
interbank market to swap market. A more attractive rate in the swap market was due to a large amount of 
available baht funds offered by foreign investors justified by the expectation of baht appreciation. However, 
after implementation of measures to curb short-term capital flows in September, by limiting financial 
institutions to borrow baht from non-residents without underlying trade or investment not exceeding 50 million 
baht per entity, volume of transactions in the swap, interbank, and repo markets were restored, resulting in a 
better liquidity balance in the money market. Subsequently, all types of [onshore] short-term money market 
rates moved in a narrow range”. Such measures to curb short-term capital flows are dubbed “moral suasion” 
by Watanagase (2005b). Note that offshore rates fell further below domestic interbank rates in Graph 9b than 




Interest rates differentials for Thailand
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1  Onshore rates minus offshore rates implied by forex swaps; monthly averages. 
Sources: Bank of Thailand; CEIC; Reuters. 
Graph 9b 
Interest rates differentials for Thailand
1 
 
1  BIBOR rates minus offshore rates implied by forex swaps; monthly averages. 
Sources: Bank of Thailand; Bloomberg; CEIC; Reuters. 
While capital controls were sufficiently robust to afford Malaysia an independent monetary 
policy during a period of a pegged exchange rate, these controls were leaky. In 1999-2000, 
the previous period when US dollar short-term interest rates climbed above those on 
Malaysian ringgit, Bank Negara reported declines in reserves notwithstanding a robust 
current account surplus (Graph 10). More recently, as ringgit short-term interest rates have 
fallen below those on the US dollar, Bank Negara Malaysia is again reporting declines in 
reserve holdings. Once again, market analysts, who might have previously viewed reserve 
holdings as excessive, have expressed concern about the potential for capital outflows 
(Le Mesurier and Tan (2005)). In any case, it would be a misapprehension to suppose that 




Net capital flows into Malaysia 
 
 
1  Three-month money market rates, quarterly averages.   
2  Change in reserve minus net current account, net 
FDI and net international debt securities flows; in billions of US dollars. 
Sources: Datastream; national data; BIS. 
In both cases, restraints on cross-border flows of capital may impede financial market 
development. For instance, some foreign investors in Thai government bonds report finding it 
difficult to manage their transactions in such a manner as not to run afoul of the 2003 constraints 
on holding onshore cash balances in baht. If this experience is general among foreign investors 
in Thai bonds, development of a more diverse investor base in them may have been 
discouraged. Restraints on cross-border capital flows also seem to work against diversity in the 
currency swap market, in which multi-year payment streams in local currency are exchanged for 
multi-year payment streams in US dollars. Globally, just over half of currency swap transactions 
occur between counterparties in different countries (BIS (2005, table E20)). In contrast, the 
currency swap markets in ringgit and the baht appear to be mostly confined to exchanges among 
residents (Table 3). For the Korean won and Singapore dollar, despite remaining restrictions on 
onshore-offshore transactions, it is evident that the cross-border transactions are the more 
dynamic piece of the rapidly growing markets for currency swaps. 
Table 3 
Foreign exchange transactions 
in the ringgit, baht, won and Singapore dollar 
April 2001  April 2004 
 
MYR
1  THB KRW SGD MYR
1  THB KRW SGD 
Global spot 





2  675  1,077 3,319 9,214  662  1,627  8,769  7,167 
Currency swaps
3  … 11 46  18  11  246  342  54 
 Local  …  10  37  11  11  236  240  12 
 Cross-border  …  1  9  7  0  9  98  31 
Source: BIS (2002, 2005), Tables E1, E20, E26, E28. 
Notes: 
1  For the Malaysian ringgit, transactions include only those reported for the Malaysian market in local 
currency.   
2    Net of local but not cross-border double-counting.     
3    Owing to incomplete counterparty 
breakdown, local and cross-border components may fall short of the currency swap totals. 188  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
3.3 Other  instruments 
In response to risks to financial stability, each central bank is capable of constraining the 
extension of credit either in relation to the borrower’s income (a flow measure) or in relation 
to the value of asset to be financed (a stock measure). It is worthwhile to consider these 
concerns and the policy responses given the global debate over the appropriate response to 
financial imbalances (Borio and White (2004), Disyatat (2005), Borio (2006), White 
(2006,a,b). Before the 1997-98 financial crisis, Bank Negara Malaysia restrained competition 
in underwriting standards in extending mortgage credit by setting a maximum loan-to-value 
ratio for mortgages. More recently, the Bank of Thailand, as described below, limited the 
extension of credit on bank and non-bank credit cards in relation to the income of the 
cardholder.  
In addition to such macroprudential goals and instruments comes the choice of operating 
instruments to serve the goal of market development. Any central bank generally enjoys a 
degree of freedom in choosing in which instruments to operate, and this choice can be 
exercised in a manner that serves the developmental goal. Below, Bank Negara Malaysia’s 
proposal to shift from direct borrowing to repurchase operations offers an example of choice 
of instrument in the service of market development, in this case bond market development. 
Of course, market development in turn serves monetary policy by improving the transmission 
of the policy interest rates to related yields. 
3.3.1   Credit policies for systemic stability and consumer protection: the Bank of 
Thailand on credit cards 
The Bank of Thailand perceived excesses in the market for credit card loans and used 
regulatory policies to limit these excesses (Devakula (2004)). Bank and non-bank issuers of 
credit cards were seen as pushing credit at high and ill disclosed rates of interest (nearly 
30% for credit cards and over 50% for personal loans) on low-income households with little 
practice in managing debt. The response can be seen as a change in the groundrules that 
came at early stage of the debt build-up. Policies to restrain competition included limits on 
the scale of credit lines (no more than five times monthly income), a minimum monthly 
income test (15,000 baht, or less than $400), a minimum monthly repayment rate (at least 
5% and later 10% of the outstanding balance) and caps on interest rates and fees (Bank of 
Thailand (2004a)).  
That these measures were applied not only to banks but also to non-bank card issuers 
demonstrates that consumer protection was at issue as well as systemic stability 
(Watanagase (2005a)). However, the fact that the Korean government had intervened to 
shore up the solvency and liquidity of a non-bank credit card issuer means that a financial 
stability argument for the extension of the regulation beyond the banking system is not far-
fetched. Indeed, the Korean experience suggests that a cycle of excess and retrenchment in 
consumer credit can be a source of macroeconomic instability. 
3.3.2  Choice of operating instruments for market development 
Central bank operations tend to bring extra liquidity to the chosen instrument(s). In general, 
there is a degree of freedom in monetary policy operations regarding the choice of 
instrument. This can be chosen for its pre-existing liquidity: before the financial crisis of 1997-98, 
central banks in East Asia often operated in foreign exchange swap markets because these 
were the most liquid parts of the money market. But the developmental perspective can BIS Papers No 31  189
 
 
reverse the reasoning behind the choice, and the central bank can operate in the market that 
lacks liquidity.
7 
A developmental aim is evident in both central banks’ approach to the repo market. The 
choice by the Bank of Thailand to operate in repo markets has tended to increase the 
liquidity of repos and to some extent holdings of government bonds as well. There remains 
an intention to induce the development of a truly private repo market, instead of having the 
Bank of Thailand a counterparty on one side of every repo transaction.  
Bank Negara Malaysia has more recently set its sights on promoting the repo market. It 
announced in February 2005 that: 
“To further develop the repo market, Bank Negara Malaysia will actively use repo 
operations as part of its monetary policy instruments
8 to manage liquidity in the 
banking system. 
“Bank Negara Malaysia’s repo operations would:  
•  Act as a catalyst to encourage market participants to actively use repos 
as an alternative funding instrument; 
•  Enhance the flexibility for market participants to use these securities in 
managing settlement risks and trading strategies; and  
•  Further strengthen the banking industry’s risk management capabilities 
by encouraging banks to move towards collateralised inter-bank transactions” 
(Bank Negara Malaysia (2005b)). 
4.  Goals, instruments and higher energy prices 
The recent rise in energy prices has presented a challenge to both central banks. These 
challenges are conditioned by energy pricing policies of the government, and also by the 
elaboration of the central banks’ monetary policy frameworks. It is worthwhile to analyse this 
challenge as faced by these two central banks because many of its aspects are faced by 
others in and outside Asia (BIS (2006)).  
At the outset, it should be recognised that the energy price rise differs from cases often taken 
to be precedents. Whereas in earlier decades cutbacks in supply led to oil “shocks”, in the 
recent past supply has expanded in the face of strong demand, which was led not least by 
the fast-growing Asian economies. In general, commodity prices have risen because world 
growth has been more robust than in a generation.  
The energy price rise tends to pose a particular challenge to emerging market economies. 
First, at medium levels of income, the energy intensity of the consumption basket tends to be 
higher (an Engle curve observation). Second, and in part as a consequence, the baseline of 
energy taxes tends to be lower in emerging markets than in more advanced countries. As a 
result, a given percentage increase in energy prices makes for a larger percentage change in 
consumer prices in emerging markets.  
                                                  
7   For a proposal to transform the non-monetary liabilities of the central bank into government debt in order to 
contribute to the development of the government bond market, see McCauley (2003, 2006). 
8   Currently the Central Bank manages liquidity largely through direct borrowing from the interbank market. Bank 
Negara Malaysia also issues short-term bills for purpose of mopping up excess liquidity in the market” 
[footnote in original]. 190  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
From the standpoint of the central bank response to this challenge, an important conditioning 
factor is the government’s energy pricing policy. Malaysia, as an energy exporting country, 
has built-in capacity to shield its domestic economy from energy price rises. That is, it can 
divert some of the fiscal windfall from higher energy prices to holding down energy prices, 
constrained at the extreme by the possibility of turning fishermen into diesel fuel exporters. 
And indeed the Malaysian government has limited the pass-through of higher energy prices, 
even as prices have been raised several times. A couple of years ago, a litre of petrol sold 
for MYR 1.12 and after several 10 cent rises, it reached MYR 1.62 (45 US cents). In contrast, 
the government in Thailand at first sought to hold down petrol and diesel prices, but late in 
2004 passed through much of the extra costs to petrol consumers. Early in 2005 the same 
was done with the price of diesel as well. Pressure remains on the pricing of the natural gas 
sold to the electric generating company, but it is fair to say that much of the energy price rise 
has passed through. All in all, more of the inflationary impulse of higher energy prices in 
Malaysia has been fiscalised, and the pressure on domestic prices from the higher 
international price of energy has been higher in Thailand than in Malaysia (Graph 11). In this 






1  CPI on transport and communications; 2002 = 100. 
Source: CEIC. 
Given any upward pressure on inflation, however, advocates of inflation targeting would 
suggest that the less elaborated monetary policy framework would make Bank Negara’s job 
harder. They would argue that without a clear specification of the inflation target, price 
pressures might more readily translate into inflation expectations.  
In another respect, however, the Bank of Thailand’s interpretation of inflation targeting could 
have made its job difficult. As part of its elaboration of inflation targeting, it had committed to 
a core measure of inflation that discounted much of the initial pressure on inflation from 
higher energy prices. Thus, when it started to raise interest rates in the middle of 2004, many 
market participants were surprised: at less than 1%, the core measure was near the bottom 
of the 0-3.5% band (Graph 4). Moreover, the country sustained several adverse 
developments ranging from tsunami - implying lower demand for tourism - to avian flu to 
unrest in the southern provinces. These were seen as easing the pressure on the labour 
market and capacity. Thus, low Bank of Thailand estimates of core inflation for the current 
year left many observers wondering when the central bank started raising the policy rate in 




Inflation estimates for Thailand 
 
1  Estimates made for the current year; annual change; in per cent.   
2  14-day repurchase rate; in per cent. 
Sources: Bank of Thailand, Inflation Reports. 
What looked to some like indecision regarding the objective can be seen in retrospect as 
avoiding a trap in the core measure. Such a measure intends to exclude volatile prices, but 
energy prices showed a trend as well as volatility around it. More broadly, what is the 
appropriate response if the rapid growth of Asian economies was holding down the prices of 
manufactures (China) and cheapening some previously non-traded services (India), while 
pushing up commodity prices? It is not obvious that the right answer is to pay attention to the 
prices being held down while ignoring those being pushed up. In the specific case of 
Thailand, the central bank also had to consider the sustainability of the early fiscalisation of 
higher energy prices. One could argue that the Bank of Thailand was simply appropriately 
forward-looking in its view on the core rate. On this view, the headline rate required a 
response only insofar as it informed a forecast of the future core inflation rate. Certainly, the 
timing and vigour of the policy tightening looks easier to understand when juxtaposed to 
inflation forecasts for eight quarters ahead (Graph 13).
9 As an alternative, one could argue 
that the Bank of Thailand appropriately gave some weight to headline inflation. 
Graph 13 
Inflation forecast for Thailand 
 
1  Forecast made for the following year; end-year forecast; annual change; in per cent.   
2  14-day repurchase 
rate; in per cent. 
Sources: Bank of Thailand, Inflation Reports. 
                                                  
9   Note that the Bank of Thailand forecast for targeted inflation deviates from the centre of the target band by 
more than the forecasts of the four industrial country economies as reported in Edey (2006). 192  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
On this second reading, the broader lesson that may be taken is that the elaboration of a 
monetary framework probably cannot be a once-and-for-all act. Events undermine the 
presumptions of any elaboration: recall the instability of the relationship between monetary 
aggregates and nominal output. Steve Grenville’s (2001) question of whether inflation 
targeting can be viewed as the end of monetary history, seconded by Genberg’s (2002) 
question of whether it can be viewed as the holy grail of monetary policy, remains. 
5. Independence 
Do the central banks enjoy the independence necessary to meet their objectives? To recap 
McCauley (2001), one can distinguish legal, behavioural and balance sheet independence. 
In large part, the argument in that earlier paper was destructive: the readily available Asian 
data did not support the linkage demonstrated for industrial countries and/or emerging 
market economies in general between legal or behavioural independence, on the one hand, 
and good inflation performance on the other. Indeed, the contrary hypothesis received 
stronger support on several measures of independence.  
The introduction of the notion of balance sheet independence, however, attempted to 
contribute more constructively to the discussion of central bank independence. One aspect of 
balance sheet independence had been incorporated into legal measures of independence, 
namely, whether the treasury could compel the central bank to buy its paper. And the 
European System of Central Banks has, as a defining feature, prohibited direct purchases of 
government paper by a participating central bank. But balance sheet independence can be 
compromised in many other ways. 
5.1 Legal  independence 
The acts of the two central banks date to very different times. The Central Bank of Malaysia 
Act 1958 was drawn up in peacetime and drew inspiration from, among other sources, the 
legislation of the Reserve Bank of Australia. This Act was revised in 1994. The Bank of 
Thailand’s Act of 1942 dates back to a time when checks and balances seemed more a 
hindrance than a promoter of national development. Thus, the Bank’s independence and 
accountability might be well served by a revision of the act. Among other changes, both 
monetary and financial stability policymaking might benefit if the governor were appointed for 
a fixed term, rather than serving at the pleasure of the cabinet. 
5.2 Behavioural  independence 
The legal position of the Bank of Thailand’s governor is reflected in one of the measures of 
behavioural independence, namely the turnover of the governor (Cukierman (1992) and 
Cukierman and Webb (1995)). In fact, no governor has served to retirement age in the 
history of the Bank of Thailand, save one whose time to retirement was only months in the 
first place.  
The tenure of the governor is in practice twice as long in Malaysia as in Thailand (see 
Annex). On average, the Bank Negara Malaysia governor has served 6.6 years, while her 
counterpart in Thailand has served only 3.2 years. Thus the current governor in Malaysia, 
who is the longest-serving governor in a major ASEAN country, has not reached the average 
tenure, while the recently departed governor in Thailand had exceeded the average.  
Another measure of behavioural independence is whether the governor is replaced within six 
months of a change in government. The Malaysian governor remained in office after the 
change in prime minister in October 2003. In the case of Thailand, unprecedented 
enlargement of the parliamentary majority of the prime minister early in 2005 led to questions BIS Papers No 31  193
 
 
about the tenure of the economic team. While strictly speaking there was no change of 
government in 2005 in Thailand, it was noteworthy that the central bank governor remained 
in office for six months after the election. After the coup d’etat in September 2006, Governor 
Devakula became Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister; this shift shows that central 
bank turnover in the wake of political change is not always prejudicial to central bank 
independence. In this case, the shift is seen as bringing forward legal change: “changes to 
the Bank of Thailand Act and Currency Act are underway … to give the Bank of Thailand 
more independence while securing an appropriate system of checks and balances” 
(Watanagase (2006)). 
The bank supervisory responsibilities of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Bank of Thailand 
may bolster their behavioural independence.
10 Their ability to respond to asset inflation and 
credit excesses with prudential policies rather than just interest rate hikes may shield the 
central bank from political pressure. For example, protecting banks by setting lower loan-to-
value ratios in mortgage lending is an easier sell than targeting real estate wealth with higher 
interest rates. Finally, the political act of splitting off supervision can easily be interpreted as 
a weakening of the central bank, rather than a focusing of its mandate, perhaps implying less 
behavioural independence. 
5.3  Balance sheet independence 
Balance sheet independence is defined as a central bank having control over its balance 
sheet and not taking on essentially fiscal assets. A lack of such independence may not 
immediately threaten the autonomy of monetary policy. By risking a decapitalisation of the 
central bank, however, a lack of balance sheet independence can put the central bank into 
the awkward position of needing yearly budgetary transfers or a one-time recapitalisation. 
Even in the presence of legal independence, there is likely to be a price to pay at the time the 
ministry of finance makes a payment to the central bank. 
It is the rule rather than an exception for a central bank to experience a compromise of its 
balance sheet independence in the response to a major financial crisis. Taking the 
economies most affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, for instance, all of them 
follow the rule.  
Bank Indonesia suffered a loss of balance sheet independence when there was not a prompt 
fiscal take-out of its discount window advances to failed banks during the 1997-98 crisis. 
When the 2004 revised central bank act provided for some fiscal recognition of the problem, 
Bank Indonesia lost the goal independence that it had previously enjoyed (Indonesia (2004), 
p 6). Rather than being able to set the inflation target, Bank Indonesia now is tasked with 
meeting the target set by the Ministry of Finance. Some outside observers might find this 
division of labour familiar and arguably better the status quo ex ante. For the present 
purposes, however, the important point is that the loss of balance sheet independence led to 
the loss of goal independence.  
                                                  
10  Consistent with the Bank of England’s gaining its independence in monetary policymaking while losing its 
responsibility for bank supervision, some would argue that the vesting of this responsibility in a separate 
agency sharpens the central bank’s mandate and prevents conflicts of interest and risks to reputation arising 
from the exercise of that responsibility. The arguments to the contrary, however, may be stronger for an 
emerging market economy than an advanced one. While a large, advanced country may have sufficient pool 
of talent to have separate bureaucracies compete for financially trained personnel, this is likely to prove more 
problematic in a small or emerging economy. To the extent that a central bank has built up credibility, 
moreover, splitting off supervision will create a need to build up credibility in the new agency. 194  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
For its part, the Bank of Korea found itself once again discounting loans to small and 
medium-sized enterprises at below-market interest rates. This is a quasi-fiscal operation that 
had been wound down before the crisis. 
Our two central banks were not spared, though their compromises of balance sheet 
independence vary in scale and resolution. Bank Negara Malaysia capitalised Danamodel, 
an instrument to recapitalise the banks. It sold bonds and invested in several distressed 
banks. It is winding down and Bank Negara Malaysia stands to recover its investment.  
The Bank of Thailand provided assistance to distressed financial institutions in the midst of 
the crisis through the Financial Institutions Development Fund. The Bank of Thailand owns 
the FIDF, staffs and in effect funds it by serving as its counterparty in regular short-term fund-
raising through the repo market. Sales of assets of failed financial institutions have left a 
substantial negative equity position. There have been several rounds of the government 
assuming the burden in whole or part. In one round, the government undertook to pay 
interest coupons on bonds sold to recapitalise the FIDF, while the Bank of Thailand 
undertook to pay the corpus of the bond out of profits on management of the foreign 
exchange reserves. Given that the foreign exchange reserves are financed at the margin 
largely by interest-bearing debt, such profits are far from assured, however. The FIDF may 
be wound up within the next several years.  
Challenges to central bank balance sheet independence continue, however. It is 
understandable that a variety of adverse developments, ranging from an outbreak of avian 
flu, to ethnopolitical conflict in the southern provinces, to a tidal wave, would lead to pressure 
on the central bank to do something. Still, discounting bank loans to private businesses at 
subsidised interest rates must be recognised as mixing fiscal policy, in the form of the 
allocation of seigniorage, with monetary policy. 
In sum, the response to the financial crisis of 1997-98 unsurprisingly posed challenges of 
varying types and intensity to the central banks of the most affected economies. Seven years 
on, much progress has been made in restoring balance sheet independence. 
6. Conclusions   
The monetary policies of Malaysia and Thailand offer points of comparison and contrast. 
Both seek to stabilise the rate of inflation, with Malaysia operating without and Thailand 
operating within an explicit inflation targeting framework. The latter assigns a pre-eminent 
position to a core measure of inflation, but the record suggests that the Bank of Thailand has 
recognised the trend element of higher energy prices and thus pre-emptively moved against 
the risk of higher inflation notwithstanding a series of adverse developments on the demand 
and the supply side. Both central banks seek to stabilise the exchange rate, with Malaysia to 
date having given more weight to the bilateral exchange rate against the dollar and Thailand 
attempting to stabilise the effective exchange rate. In both cases, a short-term interest rate 
serves as an operating target, with liquidity-draining operations the modal means to hit the 
target. Malaysia has recently chosen the overnight interest rate, while Thailand has since the 
financial crisis of 1997-98 opted for the two-week repo rate. In both cases, sterilised 
intervention supported by restrictions on cross-border money market and foreign exchange 
transactions are assigned to the goal of stabilising the exchange rate. In both cases, the 
central bank embraces broader goals of macrofinancial stabilisation and assigns credit 
policies to this goal. In addition, in both cases the central bank embraces a developmental 
role in the financial markets. With regard to governance, both central banks enjoy 
considerable behavioural independence, and the public interest might be well served by 




Governors of the central banks of Malaysia and Thailand 
 
Malaysia 
No  Name  Period in office 
1  Tan Sri W H Wilcock   January 1959 -  July 1962 
2  Tun Ismail bin Mohamed Ali   July 1962 -  July 1980 
3  Tan Sri Abdul Aziz bin Taha   July 1980 -  June 1985 
4  Tan Sri Dato’ Jaffar bin Hussein   June 1985 -  May 1994 
5  Tan Sri Dato’ Ahmad bin Mohd Don   May 1994 -  August 1998 
6  Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Ali Abul Hassan bin 
Sulaiman   September 1998 -  April 2000 
7  Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz   May 2000 -  current 





No  Name  Period in office 
1  H H Prince Vivadhanajaya  27 November 1942 - 16 October 1946 
2  Mr Serm Vinicchayakul  17 October 1946 - 24 November 1947 
3  Mr Leng Srisomwongse  25 November 1947 - 2 September 1948 
4  H H Prince Vivadhanajaya  3 September 1948 - 2 December 1948 
5  Mr Leng Srisomwongse  3 December 1948 - 3 August 1949 
6  M L Dej Snidvongs  4 August 1949 - 29 February 1952 
7  Mr. Serm Vinicchayakul  1 March 1952 - 24 July 1955 
8  Mr Kasem Sriphayak  25 July 1955 - 23 July 1958 
9  Mr Jote Guna-Kasem  24 July 1958 - 3 May 1959 
10  Mr Puey Ungphakorn  11 June 1959 - 15 August 1971 
11  Mr Bisudhi Nimmanhaemin  16 August 1971 - 23 May 1975 
12  Mr Snoh Unakul  24 May 1975 - 31 October 1979 
13  Mr Nukul Prachuabmoh  1 November 1979 - 13 September 1984 
14  Mr Kamchorn Sathirakul  14 September 1984 - 5 March 1990 
15  Mr Chavalit Thanachanan  6 March 1990 - 30 September 1990 
16  Mr Vijit Supinit  1 October 1990 - 1 July 1996 
17  Mr Rerngchai Marakanond  13 July 1996 - 28 July 1997 
18  Mr Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi  31 July 1997 - 4 May 1998 
19  M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul  7 May 1998 - 30 May 2001 
20  M R Pridiyathorn Devakula  31 May 2001 - 6 October 2006 
21  Ms Tarisa Watanagase  8 November 2006 - current 
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